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COMMENT
FUTURE SCOPE OF MINNESOTA'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY
INTRODUCTION
Defining the scope of decisional privacy-the right to make behav-
ioral choices free from undue governmental interference-requires
law-making which necessarily gives effect to strongly held beliefs in
philosophy, politics, religion and law. Defining the scope of deci-
sional privacy also determines whose interests will receive greater
protection: those legislatively defined as society's or those which de-
fine the individual. To what extent should the law regulate an indi-
vidual's decision on how to conduct his or her private life? Defining
the scope of decisional privacy not only responds to that question
but also indicates what values are animated by the privacy right.
Two theoretic bases can be identified as defining the scope of deci-
sional privacy. The more restrictive view, denominated here as the
familial context approach, defines the scope of privacy protection ac-
cording to the type of behavioral choice being made. Under the fa-
milial context approach decisional privacy is of derivative value
only-family, marriage and procreation choices are protected be-
cause of the traditional value accorded individual instead of state
control over the creation and complexion of the family unit. The
more expansive view, accords decisional privacy independent value.
Referred to here as the individual autonomy basis, individual auton-
omy and dignity are the seminal notions on which privacy rights are
based. Decisional privacy is protected in order to preserve individual
liberty.
In the recent Minnesota case of State v. Gray,' a defendant charged
with the criminal offense of sodomy challenged the statute2 as an
unconstitutional infringement of his right to privacy as protected by
the federal and the Minnesota Constitutions.3 Because of the partic-
ular facts of the case, the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision to
uphold the sodomy statute is not the focus of this Comment.4 In-
1. 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
2. MINN. STAT. § 609.293 prohibits voluntary acts of sodomy. "'Sodomy'
means carnally knowing any person by the anus or by or with the mouth." MINN. STAT.
§ 609.293, subd. 1 (1986) (emphasis added).
3. Gray, 413 N.W.2d at 109.
4. Finding that the defendant had not engaged in an act of consensual sexual
behavior, the court limited its approval of the sodomy statute only as it applied to
commercial, and therefore public, sexual behavior. Id. at 113-14.
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stead, this Comment will focus on questions concerning the theoretic
basis of decisional privacy raised by the court's announcement that a
right to privacy exists under the Minnesota Constitution.
Gray also provides a useful context in which to examine the scope
of privacy protection which will develop. Sexual behavior is a
uniquely intimate and private concern. Moreover, whether private
consensual sexual behavior is protected by the right to privacy de-
pends upon which theory of privacy informs the decision. Thus, sex-
ual behavior is also uniquely suited to an understanding of the
arguments regarding a familial context or an individual autonomy
basis for extending privacy protection.
Despite its announcement that a right to privacy exists within the
Minnesota Constitution,5 the court left determination of the scope
of state constitutional protection of the right to privacy to be decided
in future cases. 6 The court strongly reiterated the axiom that the
Minnesota Constitution may provide greater protection to Minne-
sota citizens than the protection provided by the United States Con-
stitution. 7 This Comment will examine the possible right-to-privacy
analysis which Minnesota courts may develop. The practical impor-
tance of state constitutional protection of a right to privacy can be
seen in the number, variety and conviction with which privacy issues
are debated.8 Further, advancing technology in fields such as
medicine and electronics as well as the increasing complexity of so-
cial behavior creates new subjects in which right to privacy issues will
surface. 9 Finally, while commentators debate the nature and origin
5. Id.
6. Id. at 114. When discussing whether the Minnesota Constitution provided a
broader scope of privacy rights than that recently determined under the federal Con-
stitution, the court said, "[t]oday's decision is limited to a holding that any asserted
Minnesota constitutional privacy right does not encompass the protection of those
who traffic in commercial sexual conduct." Id. Thus, the court carefully limited its
holding to find that a fundamental right to engage in sodomous acts within a sex for
compensation relationship does not exist. Id. The defendant was denied standing to
challenge the statute on behalf of those who practice private consensual acts of oral
or anal sex. Id. at 113. The court denied standing because the rights of those indi-
viduals will not be affected by the Gray decision. Id.
7. Id. at 111.
8. The following cases illustrate the variety of contexts in which a right to pri-
vacy has been claimed: Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (length of hair); Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (disclosure of personal information); Illinois NORML,
Inc. v. Scott, 66 Ill. App. 3d 633, 383 N.E.2d 1330 (1978) (possession of drugs);
Chicago v. Wilson, 75 11. 2d 525, 389 N.E.2d 522 (1978) (cross-dressing); People v.
Fries, 42 Il. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (Il1. 1969) (mandatory helmet use); In Re Quin-
lan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (nonconsensual medical treatment).
9. The committee report to the Illinois Bill of Rights Committee, submitted
with the recommendation to add an explicit prohibition against invasions of privacy
in its state "search and seizure" provision, warned:
It is doubtless inevitable that any person who chooses to enjoy the benefits
[Vol. 15
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of the federal right to privacy, states are able to purposefully select
the scope of privacy as befits their own communities.' 0
Recent developments in federal privacy jurisprudence indicate a
restructuring of the theoretical basis for the right to privacy recog-
nized in the federal Constitution." The scope of protection af-
forded the right to make decisions concerning personal, nonharmful
behavior appears to be restricted to decisions regarding family, mar-
riage and procreation.12 Advocates of a familial context approach to
defining the scope of federal privacy protection rely on case law and
on traditional notions regarding the sanctity of the family unit.' 3
The individual autonomy basis for the right to privacy results from
the constitutional origin of the right as emanating from, among
other sources, the ninth amendment protecting inalienable and in-
herent rights. 14 The notion is that the right of privacy inures to an
individual to protect his or her individual autonomy from erosion
caused by governmental regulation.15 With this theoretical base, the
right to privacy is rooted in the concept of individual liberty.16
of living in an organized society cannot also claim the privacy he would en-
joy if he were to live away from the institutions of government and the mul-
titudes of his fellow men. It is probably also inevitable that infringements
on individual privacy will increase as our society becomes more complex, as
government institutions are expected to assume larger responsibilities, and
as technological developments offer additional or more effective means by
which privacy can be invaded. In the face of these conditions the Commit-
tee concluded that it was essential to the dignity and well being of the indi-
vidual that every person be guaranteed a zone of privacy in which his
thoughts and highly personal behavior were not subject to disclosure or
review....
R. Helman & W. Whalen, Constitutional Commentary, ILL. CONST. ANN., art. I, § 6, at
317-18 (1971) (quoting Bill of Rights Committee Report).
10. During the 1970s many states amended their constitutions to include a spe-
cific right to privacy either as a separate provision, or added to the clause concerning
inalienable rights or search and seizure protection. See, e.g., ALAsKA CONST. art. I,
§ 22 (separate provision added in 1972); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (1910, amended
1987) (search and seizure clause); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (right to privacy added to
inalienable rights clause); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (separate provision added in 1978);
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (invasion of privacy added to search and seizure clause in
1970); LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 10, 11 (separate provision
prohibiting invasion of privacy added in 1972); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (added to
search and seizure clause).
11. See Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity,
40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 564-92 (1986) [hereinafter Survey].
12. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
13. See Survey, supra note 11, at 567-80.
14. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court held
that the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments created a zone of privacy
protected from undue governmental interference. Id. at 484-86. The fourteenth
amendment makes the right of privacy applicable to the states. Id. at 488 (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
15. Survey, supra note 11, at 580-81.
16. Id. at 589-90.
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This Comment will advocate that a concerted choice be made to
conceptualize the Minnesota right of privacy as one grounded upon
the traditional value accorded an individual as an autonomous actor
rather than on the type of decision the individual makes. Beginning
with the United States Supreme Court's decision regarding the con-
stitutionality of Georgia's sodomy statute, and following a summary
of the history of and challenges made to state sodomy statutes, this
Comment will explore the privacy right analysis Minnesota may fol-
low in future privacy cases.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SODOMY STATUTES
Since the 1970s, prosecution under a state's sodomy statute has
typically resulted in a challenge made to the statute's constitutional-
ity.' 7 In general, statutes which referred to the prohibited behavior
as simply an act against nature were struck down for being too
vague.' 8 Where the statute criminalized sodomy only between per-
sons of the same sex and/or unmarried partners, the statute has
failed on equal protection grounds.' 9 As to arguments that the stat-
ute is an impermissible infringement on an individual's right to pri-
vacy, the lower courts have been split in deciding the constitutional
challenge. 2O Until Bowers v. Hardwick,21 the United States Supreme
17. Cases which have litigated the constitutionality of sodomy statutes include:
United States v. Lemons, 697 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1983); Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d
873 (7th Cir. 1968); Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965);
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, sub
nom., Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971); Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D.
Conn. 1966); State v. Saunders, 62 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977); State v. Ciuflini,
164 N.J. Super. 145, 395 A.2d 904 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). For a complete
discussion of the various constitutional arguments against state consensual sexual
regulation see generally W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPRESSIVE SEX LAWS (1973).
18. See Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969); State v. Sharpe, 1 Ohio App.
2d 425, 205 N.E.2d 113 (1965). See also Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (Tennes-
see's statute not unconstitutionally vague); Wainright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973)
(Florida's statute not unconstitutionally vague). But see Perkins v. North Carolina,
234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D. N.C. 1964) (statute would be void for vagueness except for
state's case law defining offense).
19. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 492, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 953, 415 N.E.2d
936, 943 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa.
91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980) (equal protection extended to unmarried sexual partners).
Cf Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973) (privacy right extended to
married partners only), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (includes un-
married partners under equal protection), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976). But see
State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (equal protection not extended to same
sex partners).
20. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (no
privacy protection), sumn. aff'd without opinion, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Contra People v.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980) (statute violates
right to privacy), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
[Vol. 15
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Court had declined to decide the issue and then examined only the
right to privacy within the context of private sexual conduct between
homosexual partners.22
Three cases are especially important to an understanding of the
arguments, both for and against, the invalidation of state sodomy
statutes on the grounds of unreasonable governmental infringement
of an individual's right to privacy as argued in Gray. They are also
important to an understanding of how the theoretical nature of the
privacy right as being based on a familial context or upon individual
autonomy determines the outcome of the challenge. First, Doe. v.
Commonwealth's Attorney 23 found that the right of privacy did not ex-
tend to homosexual sodomy.24 The United States Supreme Court
gave this case summary affirmance.25 Second, People v. Onofre26 held
that the right of privacy did include consensual sodomy and that the
statute was not reasonably related to any state interest which would
legitimize the statute's infringement on that right.27 The United
States Supreme Court declined to hear the case on appeal. 28 Finally,
Bowers v. Hardwick has become precedent for privacy challenges to
state prohibition of private sexual behavior between partners of the
same sex which are based on the United States Constitution.29
When the United States Supreme Court was presented with the
same issues as those faced by the lower courts, the question of
21. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
22. The Court noted thatJohn and Mary Doe were plaintiffs in the action but had
been denied standing by the district court to assert their constitutional challenge to
the sodomy statute as it applied to heterosexual conduct. When the court of appeals
sustained the district court's decision denying standing the Does did not continue the
appeal to the Supreme Court. Id. at 188 n.2. Thus, the Court examined the constitu-
tionality of the statute as it was applied to Hardwick and not a facial challenge. Id.
23. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
24. Id. at 1203.
25. 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (without opinion). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Ste-
vens would have set the case for oral argument. Id. Disagreement as to whether the
affirmance was on the merits or on the decision regarding standing led to different
use of the case as precedent by the lower courts. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp.
1121, 1137-38 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (reasoning that
Doe became precedent when summarily affirmed), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
26. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 987 (1981).
27. Id. at 488-90, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951-52, 415 N.E.2d at 940-41.
28. 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (without opinion). Thus, because of the opposite result
of the cases, the summary affirmance given Doe had unclear weight and tended to
support those who argued that the affirmance regarded only the standing issues. See
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 493, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 954, 415 N.E.2d at 943. See also supra note
25.
29. In Gray, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that the Hardwick holding was
"dispositive of and wiped out" Gray's argument that the Minnesota sodomy statute
violated the federal Constitution. 413 N.W.2d at 110.
1989]
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whether the Constitution protected against governmental interfer-
ence with the right of privacy to conduct private consensual sexual
behavior was not subjected to scrutiny.30 In its five to four decision
in Hardwick, the Court held that no fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy exists.31 In dicta, however, the Court said that
the notion that the line of cases regarding privacy rights "stand for
the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between con-
senting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is
insupportable.' 32
In order for personal conduct to be protected within the scope of
the right to privacy extended by the federal Constitution, that con-
duct must be either "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" 33 or
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."34 The Court
then traced the history of the criminalization of sodomy to illustrate
that the practice of sodomy has traditionally met with public dis-
taste. 35 Therefore, the practice of sodomy was found not to be
30. 478 U.S. at 191. One of the dissenting opinions took issue with the Court's
"almost obsessive focus" on homosexual activity when the state had broadened the
statute to include heterosexual activity and therefore should have addressed the sub-
ject of the statute-oral and anal sexual activity-regardless of the sexual orientation
of the person challenging the statute as an intrusion on right to privacy and right of
intimate expression. Id. at 200 (dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun, joined by
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens). See also supra note 22.
As the dissenters argued in Hardwick, the eighth amendment, ninth amendment
or the equal protection clause in the fourteenth amendment could have decided the
issue differently. 478 U.S. at 201. InJustice Powell's concurring opinion, he thought
that the eighth amendment prohibiting punishment of status would have been a suc-
cessful challenge but declined to apply it in the case because Hardwick was not prose-
cuted under the statute and did not raise the issue below. Id. at 197-98. The Court
has previously supplied the appropriate constitutional grounds for a challenge to the
validity of a statute when absent from the petitioner's argument and, according to the
dissent, is obligated to do so. Id. at 201-02 and cases cited therein.
31. 478 U.S at 192. Does it hold more? ChiefJustice Burger wrote "separately
to underscore [his] view that in constitutional terms there is no such thing as a funda-
mental right to commit heterosexual sodomy." Id. at 196 (emphasis added). Interest-
ingly, the argument has not been made that by criminalizing sodomy and by finding
the behavior unprotected by the Constitution, homosexuals are completely denied
sexual expression. That the homosexual relationship may have identical attributes of
the marriage relationship which were the basis of the United States Supreme Court's
protection of the marriage unit is particularly relevant: marriage "is an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Douglas, J., plurality opinion). It is the state which withholds
married status from homosexual partners. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association,
89 YALE LJ. 624, 661-63 (1980).
32. 478 U.S. at 191.
33. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
34. 478 U.S. at 190-91 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)).
35. 478 U.S. at 192-95.
[Vol. 15
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"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."36 Moreover,
the Court listed the previous privacy cases to find that the scope of
decisional privacy protected by the Constitution has been developed
only so far as to include choices concerning family, marriage or pro-
creation.S7 The Court could not find a relationship between homo-
sexual activity and the three arenas in which a fundamental right to
freedom from interference is constitutionally provided.38
The Hardwick Court restricted the scope of the federal right to de-
cisional privacy to a notion of familial context rather than individual
autonomy.39 In other words, according to the Hardwick Court, pro-
tection of decisional privacy from governmental interference is based
on the nature of the decision being made rather than on the value of
individual liberty or autonomy. The majority was of the opinion that
the established privacy right protecting family, marriage and procre-
ation decisions does not extend to decisions regarding private con-
sensual sexual behavior between adults-regardless of their sexual
preference .40
In contrast to the conclusion of the majority in Hardwick, commen-
tators citing the same line of cases for the proposition that the right
to decisional privacy is grounded on personal autonomy outnumber
those that support the view that the privacy right is grounded in a
36. Id. at 194. According to the dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun, this is
the major flaw in the majority's opinion. See supra note 30. The history of nonen-
forcement suggests the moribund character of the law as does the fact that, while the
majority cites existing statutes, 26 states have repealed them. 478 U.S. at 198. Both
dissenting opinions noted the similarity of history between sodomy statutes and mis-
cegenation statutes which were found unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967). Id. at 210 n.5, 216 n.9.
37. Id. at 190. The lower courts as well as the dissenting opinions in Hardwick
have used the same line of cases in support of their decision to hold state sodomy
statutes unconstitutional. See id. at 204. Two interpretations of the federal privacy
cases have emerged: the majority's contextual restriction of the cases and the dis-
sents' understanding of the personal nature of the decision being made and the lib-
erty interest in making it free of governmental restraint. Id. at 216-17 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting; joined by justices Brennan and Marshall). "The character of the Court's
language in these cases brings to mind the origins of the American heritage of free-
dom-the abiding interest in individual liberty that makes certain state intrusions on
the citizen's right to decide how he will live his own life intolerable." Id. at 217.
(quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir.
1975) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976)).
38. 478 U.S. at 191.
39. The Court's decision was a majority of 5-4 with the dissenting Justices em-
phasizing the language in previous cases which celebrate the liberty interest of auton-
omous individuals conducting private lives. Id. at 208. Thus, "every free citizen" has
equal liberty interests whether homosexual or heterosexual in deciding how to live
and how to conduct "personal and voluntary associations with his companions." Id.
at 218-19.
40. Id. at 191.
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familial context. 4 ' This difference of opinion, as well as the dissent-
ing opinion in Hardwick, indicates the importance of examining pre-
vious cases in order to understand the changing scope of privacy
protection. For example, although Eisenstadt v. Baird42 extended pri-
vacy protection to an unmarried individual's decision to use contra-
ceptives, the case was not cited by the majority in Hardwick for the
proposition that protection of decisional privacy was owed to the in-
dividual qua individual.4 3 Instead, procreation decisions such as
birth control or abortion were characterized as decisions concerning
the creation of the parent/child relationship; the creation of family.44
Thus, justification for granting privacy protection to decisions of un-
married women in choosing whether to use contraceptives is based
on the familial context of the decision, not upon the autonomy of
41. See, e.g., Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy:
Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 361 (1979); Grey,
Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 98-100 (1980).
Of articles published between 1965 and 1979, 38 out of 41 commentators predicted
that the right of privacy would extend to private consensual sexual behavior. Id.
42. 405 U.S. 438, 452 (1972).
43. Compare Judge Merhige's use of Eisenstadt to show that sexual matters be-
tween married couples were granted privacy and extended in Eisenstadt because it is
the individual, not the couple, who are free from governmental intrusion into matters
which fundamentally effect the individual. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1204 (dissenting
opinion). Accord Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 625 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd, 539
F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 977 (1976). In Hardwick, the majority
declined to find that decisions regarding sexual behavior are ones which fundamen-
tally affect an individual's life, restricting Eisenstadt to decisions regarding procrea-
tion. 478 U.S. at 190. However, the exact language in Eisenstadt can be read so that
procreation is just one example of decisions which fundamentally affect a person:
"[m]atters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
44. Again, the dissenting opinion disagrees with the restrictive scope which the
majority finds within previous cases and quotes the warning against "clos[ing] our
eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been
accorded shelter .... We protect those rights not because they contribute, in some
direct and material way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so cen-
tral a part of an individual's life." Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 204 (quoting Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977)).
Members of the Court also disagreed over the use of Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969) (right to watch pornography in privacy of one's home). In Hardwick,
the Court restricts its reading of Stanley to first amendment grounds. 478 U.S. at 195.
However, the dissent argues that Stanley is not about the first amendment protection
of spatial privacy but is about the individual's right to be left alone. Id. at 199. "This
case is no more about 'a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy' as the
Court purports to declare ... than Stanley ... was about a fundamental right to watch
obscene movies." Id. Stanley was important to lower courts for its emphasis not only
on individual liberty being at the core of privacy decisions, but also for the notion
that majority abhorrence of a behavior does not justify its criminalization. See Baker
v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1145 (1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 489 n.3, 434 N.Y.S.2d
947, 951 n.3, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940 n.3 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
[Vol. 15
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women, as individuals, to make value expressive choices.45 Should
the tendency of the United States Supreme Court to restrict deci-
sional privacy to a scope of relational rights continue, a state's consti-
tutional protection should become the focus of advocates for
decisional privacy based on the notion of individual liberty in the
realm of nonharmful behaviors.46 Indeed, the Hardwick Court re-
minded the states that state constitutional law may differ.47
II. HISTORY OF SODOMY STATUTES AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT
Understanding the history of the criminalization of sodomy is
helpful to an understanding of traditional assumptions and public
attitudes toward private sexual conduct. It has not always been a
crime to perform an act of sodomy.48 Historically, sodomy was de-
fined as an act of anal sex performed with a man or a beast.4 9 It was
first punishable only in the ecclesiastical courts and infrequently at
that.50 Blackstone traced the history of the criminalization of sod-
omy to its sources in natural law and the express laws of God.51 The
crime of sodomy entered common law in 1533 when King Henry
made it a felony punishable by hanging.52 Although the statute was
45. See generally Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 452.
46. But see Developments in the Law: Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1430-43 (1982) (many state courts rely on federal constitutional
law when interpreting state constitutions).
47. 478 U.S. at 190.
48. 2 F. POLLOCK AND F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 556 (1895).
See, e.g., Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 642-47 (Alaska 1969) (detailing the history of
the criminalization of sodomy); Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to
Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1294-97 (1977) (summarizing reli-
gious teachings against sodomy and persecution against offenders); Note, Expanding
the Right of Sexual Privacy, 27 Loy. L. REv. 1279, 1281-84 (1981) (until 1961 every
state regarded sodomy as a criminal offense).
49. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215 (1825) (referring to the "infamous
crime against nature").
50. Harris, 457 P.2d at 648-49. The word "sodomy" is believed to have come
from the name of the biblical city of Sodom which was destroyed by fire for its sins.
Blackstone believed this explained why those found by the clergy to have committed
acts of sodomy were burned alive. BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *216.
51. Blackstone's vehemence that the act is against natural law and the laws of
God expressed itself in the quote most often cited: " 'peccatum illud horrible, inter chris-
tianos non nominandum'" (that horrible crime not fit to be named among Christians).
Harris, 457 P.2d at 642 n.14 (quoting BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 215 (Jones ed. 1916)). Judaic law forbade homosexual sodomy, adultery,
bestiality and incest, and sex with menstruating women. Leviticus 18:11-23.
52. W. BARNETr, supra note 17, at 80. This first sodomy statute in English law
prohibited "[tihe abominable and detestable crime against nature, committed with
mankind or beast." Id. at 81.
Sodomy between women could not be prosecuted because sodomy at that time
required penetration. V. BULLOUGH, HOMOSEXUALITY: A HISTORY 35 (1979). Be-
cause oral sex was not included in the prohibition, some have argued that it was
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repealed by Queen Mary Tudor, Queen Elizabeth I reenacted the
statute prohibiting sodomy, defined solely as acts of anal sex.53
Thus, examination of the history of the criminalization of sodomy,
reveals not only its religious and natural law origins, but also an atti-
tude toward the act of sodomy which is no longer generally ac-
cepted.54 Known as the "infamous crime against nature,"55
Blackstone wrote little on the subject "whose very mention ... is a
disgrace to human nature." 56 It was a crime "not fit to be named" in
an indictment.57 Since the late 1950s and early 1960s, open and
frank discussion of sexual behavior has become more common. 58
Further, sexuality and sexual behavior became not only subjects of
legitimate scholarly research, but were also identified as crucial as-
pects of an individual's sense of self.59 Whatever one's views regard-
conduct unknown in England at the time that the common law regarding prohibited
sexual acts was being formed. Harris, 457 P.2d at 642 (citing Herring v. State, 119
Ga. 709, 720-21, 46 S.E. 876, 881-82 (1904) (reasoning that oral sodomy was not
widespread in the days of early English common law because of the lack of cases and
legal commentary on the subject). Others, however, have concluded, "Surely these
forms of conduct are as old as the human race." 457 P.2d at 642.
53. W. BARNETr, supra note 17, at 81.
54. See Harris, 457 P.2d at 644 ("With the expansion of the concept of individual
freedom in our society as exemplified in the exercise of government and the trends of
our constitutional law, there has been a corresponding decrease of religious beliefs
as determinants of social and legal principles"). See also Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp.
1121, 1129 n.12 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478
U.S. 1022 (1986) (modem theological attitudes more accepting of homosexuality);
State v. Ciuffini, 164 N.J. Super. 145, 395 A.2d 904 (1978) (noting changing legisla-
tive and judicial attitudes toward the criminalization of sexual conduct).
55. BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at *215.
56. Id.
57. Id. at *216.
58. Scientific studies of human sexuality include the following: J. GAGNON & W.
SIMON, SEXUAL CONDUCT: THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF HUMAN SEXUALITY (1973); A. KIN-
SEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948); A.
KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953).
Many courts' analysis of the constitutionality of sexual prohibitions cite to such au-
thorities for an understanding of what sexual practices are occurring in society as
well as society's changed attitudes regarding sexuality. See Harris, 457 P.2d at 644-45
(noting that scientific research into sexual behavior, including the "epochal work of
Sigmund Freud, the taxonomic studies of Alfred Kinsey and the work of countless
others," supports the court's analysis). Despite the controversy regarding research
of human sexuality, the court noted its impact on changing social and intellectual
attitudes regarding sexual behavior. Id. at 645. See also Baker, 553 F. Supp. at
1129-31 (reliance upon assertion of general platitudes, i.e. morality, welfare, safety
and procreation, was an inadequate showing of a compelling state interest necessary
to justify criminal proscription of homosexual conduct). But see State v. Pilcher, 242
N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976) (defense submitted publications-referred to by the
court as "sex manuals"-have no place in court's decision-making nor is the author-
ity, despite its popularity, sufficient for taking judicial notice thereof).
59. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is 'a
[Vol. 15
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 15
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss1/15
FUTURE SCOPE OF PRIVACY
ing the propriety of medical, sociological and psychological
discourse on human sexuality, the debate continues. Whatever one's
comfort level in the face of increased public discussion of sexuality,
the discussion accelerates to meet such problems as AIDS, teenage
pregnancy, and overpopulation.
Before 1962, all fifty states had statutes prohibiting sodomy. 60
The American Law Institute (ALI) proposed the decriminalization of
private consensual sodomy between adults in its 1962 draft of the
Model Penal Code. 6' The definition of sodomy as a crime was
viewed by the ALI commentators as an attempt to coerce private mo-
rality rather than an attempt to prevent harm to individuals or to
society. 62
To date, only twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have
retained statutes which criminalize consensual sodomy.63 Of those
sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community wel-
fare, and the development of human personality.'" Id. (quoting Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
60. 478 U.S. at 193-94.
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.5 Commentary at 277 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1953).
62. As long as there is no harm to secular interests of society, private morals are
the concern of spiritual authorities. State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 397-98, 301 A.2d 748,
754 (1973). Accord Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1145; People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). Contra
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729, 733 (N.D. Tex. 1970). See Note, Behind the
Facade: Understanding the Potential Extension of the Constitutional Right to Privacy to Homo-
sexual Conduct, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1233, 1244 n.74 (1986) [hereinafter Behind the Facade]
(detailing the "debate that was unleashed" by the commentary of the American Law
Institute which described why, absent harm, private sexual behavior is a matter of
private morality not criminal enforcement). See generally Note, Doe and Dronenburg."
Sodomy Statutes Are Constitutional, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645 (1985) [hereinafter Doe
and Dronenburg] (arguing that it is a legislative decision to use the police power to
properly protect public morality by criminal statutes directed at private nonharmful
behavior). But see Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624. 627
(1980) (the question should not be whether the government can regulate private mo-
rality, but what level of governmental interest should be demanded to justify such
regulations). When examining the debate regarding government action in the realm
of private/public morality, a quote by Justice Holmes is instructive: "what I have
found spoil more good talks than anything else;-long arguments on special points
between people who differ on the fundamental principles on which these points de-
pend." Reprinted in THE ATLANTIc, p. 20, col. 4 (Nov. 1987). As yet, writers who
support criminalization of private behavior to protect public morality have not ex-
plored the assumption that sodomy performed between consenting adults, regardless
of their sexual preference, is immoral behavior.
63. The statutes are: ALASKA STAT. § 13A-6-60(2) (1982) (prohibits sodomy only
between persons not married to each other); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411, 1412
(Supp. 1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-14-122 (1977) (prohibits sodomy only between
members of the same sex); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 800.02 (West 1976) (provision making sodomy a misdemeanor; § 800.01 which
made the "abominable and detestable crime against nature" a felony was repealed in
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states, six prohibit consensual sodomy only between members of the
same sex. 64 Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada and
Texas decriminalized sodomy between heterosexual partners while
prohibiting homosexual sodomy.6 5 Both homosexual and hetero-
1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1987); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3505 (Supp. 1987) (prohibits sodomy between members of the same sex
and between a person and an animal, but not between a male and a female); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 510.070-.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merr ill 1985) (first, second and third
degree sodomy applies to nonconsensual sodomy, fourth degree applies to consen-
sual sodomy only between members of the same sex); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.89,
(West 1986); MD. CRIM. CODE ANN. §§ 553, 554 (1982); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.158 (1981) (if an offender is a "sexually delinquent person," the statute allows
an indeterminate sentence with a maximum of life imprisonment for the conviction of
committing sodomy); MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1987) (prohibits only consensual sod-
omy); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.060-090 (Vernon
1979 & Supp. 1988) (prohibits sodomy between persons of the same sex, and be-
tween persons not married to each other or performed without consent and with
force; section 566.010 defines "deviate sexual intercourse" as contact between geni-
tals and mouth, tongue, hand or anus); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1987); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1987) (prohibits sodomy only between members of the same
sex); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (1983); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 11-10-1 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-612 (1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1974) (pro-
hibits sodomy only between members of the same sex; only statute entitled, "Homo-
sexual Conduct"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-.5403 (1988).
64. See statutes cited supra note 63.
65. In 1982, a federal district court in Texas found that the Texas statute was
unconstitutional on the grounds of equal protection and right to privacy. Baker v.
Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1122 (N.D. Tex 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). The district court's thirty-three page opinion con-
tains an excellent discussion of the emotional and psychological impact of the discov-
ery of one's homosexuality, and is a good example of how to demonstrate the impact
of the state on an important sphere of decision-making. See infra notes 155-59 and
accompanying text. The court also analyzed the major cases in other jurisdictions.
Id. at 1135-40. Nevertheless, the Baker decision was reversed on the grounds that the
United States Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney
was a decision on the merits, and thus binding precedent on the privacy right chal-
lenge. Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
As to the equal protection challenge, the appellate court found that homosexuals
do not constitute a suspect class. Thus, the state need only show a rational relation
to "implementing morality" which the United States Supreme Court had found to be
a permissible state objective. Id. at 292. The dissent stated that the court was
"[d]etermined to uphold the constitutionality of a Texas statute whatever obstacles
bar the way, even though the majority opinion tramples every procedural rule it con-
siders." Id. at 293. The appeal was made by a person not named as a party nor a
class representative. Id. at 294. In fact, the appealing party, Danny Hill, had turned
down an invitation to intervene, and when none of the named defendants sought an
appeal, Hill did. Id. The Attorney General of the State of Texas initiated but then
withdrew an appeal. Hill filed a motion in district court to intervene and substitute
himself as a class representative. While the motions were pending in district court,
Hill filed the same motions in the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 294. Interestingly, two weeks
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sexual sodomy are prohibited in the Minnesota statute.66
Not until 1921 was consensual sodomy included in Minnesota's
prohibition against sodomy. 67 The first criminal code, adopted in
1851, included sodomy as a crime punishable by one to five years
imprisonment.68 Both the scope of the statute and the punishment
for violations increased. In 1891, a prison sentence of five to twenty
years was the penalty for committing the "detestable and abomina-
ble crime against nature," 69 including bestiality, necrophilia, and in-
voluntary oral and anal intercourse. 70 After the inclusion of
consensual oral and anal intercourse in 1921, the statute remained
unchanged until 1967 when punishment of consensual sodomy was
reduced to a prison sentence of up to one year, or a fine of $1,000,
or both.7T Finally, in 1977, the statute was amended to prohibit only
acts of consensual sodomy.72 Forced sexual behavior and adult cor-
ruption of minors are now crimes prosecuted under other sexual
misconduct statutes, as are bestiality and necrophilia.73
However, the history of Minnesota's sodomy statute is incomplete
before his oral argument before the circuit court, the district court denied Hill's mo-
tions to intervene. Id. at 295.
66. MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1986).
67. GEN. STAT. MINN. § 10183 (1921).
68. MINN. REV. STAT. ch. 107 § 13 (1851).
69. MINN. GEN. STAT. § 6216 (1891).
70. Id. Bestiality and attempted sexual intercourse with a dead body is still pro-
hibited in Minnesota. MINN. STAT. § 609.294 (1986).
71. The statute defined offenders as those who "voluntarily submit to such carnal
knowledge" and the carnal knowledge proscribed is "carnally knowing in any manner
any animal or bird, or ... any male or female person by the anus or by or with the
mouth or attempt sexual intercourse with a dead body." GEN. STAT. MINN. § 10183
(1921). Bestiality and necrophilia were severed from the sodomy statute in 1967.
1967 Minn. Laws, ch. 507, secs. 4-5 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 609.293-.294 (1986)).
72. MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1986) (original at 1977 Minn. Laws, ch. 130, sec. 4).
There exists a discrepancy between the Advisory Committee Comments: one Com-
ment states that no distinction is drawn between voluntary and involuntary spousal
sodomy; another Comment states that subd. 5 excludes sodomous acts between
spouses when both consent. MINN. STAT. ANN. Advisory Committee's note. The lan-
guage of the statute makes no such exclusion:
Subdivision I. Definition. "Sodomy" means carnally knowing any per-
son by the anus or by or with the mouth.
Subdivision 5. Consensual acts. Whoever, in cases not coming within
the provisions of sections 609.342 or 609.344, voluntarily engages in or sub-
mits to an act of sodomy with another may be sentenced to imprisonment
for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000,
or both.
MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1986). Subdivisions 2-4 were repealed by 1977 Minn. Laws
ch. 130, sec. 10 (effective May 20, 1977). The provisions which form the exception to
subdivision five define criminal sexual misconduct and cover the repealed sections
relating to nonconsensual sodomy-that committed by force and that committed with a
child.
73. See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342-.345 (1986) and supra note 71.
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without an understanding of its enforcement. The statute is "gener-
ally not vigorously prosecuted." 74 Prior to 1977, most prosecution
under the sodomy statute was against adult males charged with the
rape of a female or with the sexual abuse of children. 75 Again, both
criminal offenses are now defined by and prosecuted under other
statutes. 76 Since the statute has been narrowed in scope to criminal-
ize only consensual sodomy, prosecution has been against those who
have performed sodomous acts in public or semi-public places. 77
Thus, private acts of consensual sodomy are prohibited by law, but
not in fact.78
Minnesota's enforcement of its sodomy statute is similar to en-
forcement of sodomy statutes nationwide. 79 Moreover, it is esti-
mated that a substantial majority of sexually active Americans
engage in sodomy.80 The discrepancy between the law proscribing a
nonharmful behavior for reasons of "morality" and the frequency
with which individuals choose to participate in the criminalized activ-
ity, may indicate a discrepancy between announced public morality
and individualized private morality.81 In other words, this may be a
74. Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Oct. 4, 1983, at IA, col. 6, quoted in Grove,
Constitutionality of Minnesota's Sodomy Law, 2 LAW AND INEQUALITY 521, 525-26 (1984).
Hennepin County had a policy of nonenforcement of the sodomy statute, as was re-
ported to Grove in an interview with the then Assistant to the County Attorney for
Hennepin County, Sexual Assault Division in 1984. Id. at 526 and 526 n.22.
75. Grove, supra note 75, at 526.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Because children are deemed unable to consent, even if a person below the
age of 16 voluntarily engages in a sodomous act, it is a nonconsensual act constitut-
ing either child abuse or criminal sexual conduct. See generally Karst, supra note 61, at
672 (explaining that adult authority over their children results in lost freedom of
choice so that incest would not only be taboo, but also nonconsensual behavior-a
behavior not within those adult consensual activities for which a privacy right may
attach).
79. Grove, supra note 74, at 522.
80. See W. MASTERS, V. JOHNSON & R. KOLODNY, MASTERS AND JOHNSON ON SEX
AND HUMAN LOVING 325-29 (1986) (discussing studies which indicate that at least
sixty-nine percent of unmarried Americans and up to eighty-seven percent of mar-
ried Americans engage in or have engaged in oral-genital sex); C. KINSEY, W. POME-
ROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 371 (1948) (45.3% of
American husbands who are well educated engage in acts of sodomy).
81. But see Behind the Facade, supra note 62, at 1235-37 (articulating the demo-
cratic principle of majority rule, the author assumes a majority finds private
sodomous activity to be reprehensible). Thus, "majoritarian morality" is a proper
democratic form and individual moral choices should be made at the ballot box. Id.
at 1247. However, explicit value choices may be found in the Constitution and repre-
sent spheres in which society has consented to nonmajoritarian rule. Bork, Aeutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 3 (1971). Alexander Hamil-
ton had feared that the enunciation of specific rights in a bill of rights would lead to
the argument that if a particular right was not enunciated, it would be deemed not to
exist. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 at 535 (A. Hamilton) (Am. Lib. Ed. 1961). Therefore,
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law which does not reflect the public's actual beliefs.
III. LOWER COURT DECISIONS
In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,82 a declaratory judgment was
sought as to the unconstitutionality of the Virginia sodomy statute as
well as an injunction against its enforcement.83 The court relied on
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman84 to emphasize
that Supreme Court precedents involved only the right to marital
privacy. 85 Justice Harlan had written that fornication, adultery and
homosexuality have always been forbidden and can claim no social
protection.86 The court rationalized its reliance on Harlan's dissent
by the fact that his dissent had been quoted in a concurring opinion
in Griswold v. Connecticut,87 and by noting his stature as a jurist.88
Thus, the Virginia court found no "authoritative judicial bar to the
proscription of homosexuality-since it is obviously no portion of
marriage, home or family life."89
The court then turned to the question of whether the state had a
legitimate interest in proscribing the conduct. The question of
whether Virginia could be barred from defining sodomy as a crime
was declared by the court to be a legislative question.90 Because the
state action "is simply directed to the suppression of crime, whether
committed in public or in private," it is properly within "the reach of
the police power." 9 ' No demand was made for the state to show that
moral delinquency results from homosexuality because the court
found it impracticable to prove and because "the law is not so exact-
he argued, only the powers that were being given the national government should be
listed, the people retaining all other power not given. See id. In contrast, Robert
Bork argues that our greatest freedom is the ability to legally enforce public morality.
R. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9 (1982). The United
States Supreme Court, however, has indicated that moral indignation of a possible
majority was not a sufficient justification for state criminalization of certain conduct.
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969).
82. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (1975), aff 'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), reh'g denied, 425 U.S.
985 (1976).
83. Id. at 1200 (plaintiffs brought the action against state prosecutors as a class of
defendants).
84. 367 U.S. 497 (1961), reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961).
85. 403 F. Supp. at 1201.
86. 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
87. 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
88. 403 F. Supp. at 1201.
89. Id. at 1202.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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ing." 92 Finally, the longevity of the statute and its ancestry injudaic
and Christian law was regarded as evidence of the state's interest and
the legitimacy of the statute itself.93 The court then concluded:
"[w]e believe that the sodomy statute, so long in force in Virginia,
has a rational basis of State interest demonstrably legitimate and
mirrored in the cited decisional law of the Supreme Court." 94
In contrast, the New York Court of Appeals found not only that
the right to privacy encompassed private consensual sexual behavior
based upon decisions of the Supreme Court, but also that the law
proscribing sodomy was not rationally related to the state's interest
in promoting public morality, protecting the individual or protecting
and promoting marriage.95 In Onofre, the original defendant was
convicted of violating a penal statute prohibiting consensual sodomy
and successfully appealed his conviction on the grounds that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional. 96 The state's appeal, and the appeal of
three other similarly situated defendants, were heard to-
gether.97Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the New York
court examined the constitutionality of its sodomy statute in the con-
text of private consensual sodomy between homosexual and hetero-
sexual partners. 98
The New York Court of Appeals emphasized that the right of pri-
vacy, which encompasses sexual behavior, allows one to make in-
dependent decisions regarding private, consensual sexual conduct
"undeterred by government restraint."9 9 The court found that vol-
untary, private sexual intimacy between adults is within the scope of
92. Id. ("It is enough for the upholding of the legislation to establish that the
conduct is likely to end in a contribution to moral delinquency.").
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1203.
95. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 486-92, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 950-53, 415
N.E.2d 936, 939-43 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). Onofre also held that the
statute violated equal protection because sodomy was not prohibited to partners that
were married to each other. Id. at 491-92, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953, 415 N.E.2d at
942-43.
96. Id. at 483-84, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948, 415 N.E.2d at 937-38.
97. Id. at 483, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948, 415 N.E.2d at 937.
98. Id. at 483-84, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948, 415 N.E.2d at 937-38.
99. Id. at 485, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949, 415 N.E.2d at 939. Onofre was prosecuted
for engaging in homosexual sodomy at his home, the other defendants were prose-
cuted for performing acts of sodomy while in an automobile on separate, distinct
occasions. Because its decision also rested on a denial of equal protection, the court
declined to address the prosecution's contention that the acts committed by defend-
ants Peoples, Gross, and Sweat were public instead of private because a hypothetical
passerby could have observed them. Id. at 485 n.2, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949 n.2, 415
N.E.2d at 938 n.2. Thus, the appeal consolidated the arguments of three men and a
woman and covered the spectrum of heterosexual and homosexual consensual
sodomy.
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the privacy right as outlined by the United States Supreme Court. ' 00
Accordingly, the court could find no rational basis for prohibiting
"what at least once was commonly regarded as 'deviant' conduct, so
long as the decisions are voluntarily made by adults in a noncommer-
cial, private setting."' 0 The court declined to make a theological,
moral or psychological evaluation of consensual sodomy.102
The prosecution claimed that the statute served three legitimate
state interests, and thus constituted a permissible intrusion on the
right to consensual sexual conduct.103 First, the court examined the
state's interest in protecting the participants from physical harm. 104
The court found no evidence of present harm to participants, nor
had the legislature identified any harm when the sodomy statute was
enacted.' 05 According to legislative history, legislators feared that
the public would consider a repeal of the sodomy statute to be af-
firmative legislative approval of sodomy.106
The second state interest advanced for criminalizing consensual
sodomy was the promotion of public morality.107 Absent a commer-
cial component, however, the court could not find that the perform-
ance of a sodomous act out of the view of the public had any effect on
public morality.1OS Further, the court noted that a state penal code is
100. Id. at 485, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949, 415 N.E.2d at 939. The court defined the
right at issue as follows:
[T]he right addressed in the present context is not, as a literal reading of the
phrase might suggest, the right to maintain secrecy with respect to one's
affairs or personal behavior; rather, it is a right of independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions, with a concomitant right to conduct
oneself in accordance with those decisions, undeterred by governmental
restraint....
Id. Justice Brandeis characterized the decisional privacy right not only as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men" but also as "the
right to be let alone." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent in Hardwick cites the Olmstead dissent for the
proposition that the fundamental right being asserted is not the right to engage in a
particular sex act as the majority believed, but the "right to be let alone." 478 U.S. at
199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Earlier cases in which privacy protection had been
extended did not center on a fundamental right to watch pornography in the home
or to place interstate bets from a phone booth, but on the right to be left alone.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199 (recalling Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (pornog-
raphy) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (telephone bets)).
101. Onofre 51 N.Y.2d at 488, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951, 415 N.E.2d at 940-41 (foot-
note omitted).
102. Id. at 489 n.3, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951 n.3, 415 N.E.2d at 940 n.3.
103. The three purported state interests were: (1) preventing physical harm to the
participants; (2) upholding public morality; (3) protecting the institution of marriage.
Id. at 488-89, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951, 415 N.E.2d at 941.
104. Id. at 489, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951, 415 N.E.2d at 941.
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting N.Y. LEGIS. ANN., 1965, pp. 51-52).
107. Id. at 488, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951, 415 N.E.2d at 941.
108. Id. at 490, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952, 415 N.E.2d at 941. Compare Doe v. Common-
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not the proper vehicle with which to enforce moral or theological
values-even those arguably held by a majority. 109 Rather, noncoer-
cive methods such as teaching, parental guidance, moral persuasion
and counseling are appropriate to enforcement of public morality."l 0
Finally, the state argued that the statute promoted a valid state in-
terest in protecting the institution of marriage."'l Again, the court
found no evidence that private consensual sodomy interferes with
marriage.' 12 "[O]ne is [not] a substitute or alternative for the other
nor is any empirical data submitted which demonstrates that mar-
riage is nothing more than a refuge for persons deprived by legisla-
tive fiat of the option of consensual sodomy. ... " 13 In other words,
if consensual sodomy between adults was legalized, the incidence of
marriage would not decline; nor would the divorce rate increase.
The majority dismissed the dissent's reasoning in support of the stat-
ute as an "appeal ... to the historical, conventional characterization
which attached to the practice of sodomy."114
IV. CHALLENGE UNDER THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION
Following the precedent set by Hardwick, the Minnesota trial court
restricted the Gray challenge to the state's sodomy statute to state
constitutional grounds.' 5 Although Gray's challenge was based on
a right to privacy argument, the facts concerning his prosecution did
not lead to consideration of whether the Minnesota Constitution
protects the privacy of an individual's sexual conduct against unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion.1t6 According to the court, Gray had
wealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901
(1976) (state not required to prove moral delinquency caused by homosexuality).
109. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 488 n.3, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951 n.3, 415 N.E.2d at 940 n.3.
The state had failed to show that the statute served to do anything other than to
"restrict individual conduct and impose a concept of private morality chosen by the
State." Id. at 490, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952, 415 N.E.2d at 941.
110. See id. at 488 n.3, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951 n.3, 415 N.E.2d at 940 n.3.
111. Id. at 488-89, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951, 415 N.E.2d at 941.
112. Id. at 490, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952, 415 N.E.2d at 941.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 491, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952-53, 415 N.E.2d at 942.
115. 413 N.W.2d at 110.
116. The court granted Gray standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute only as it applied to him. Id. at 112. Gray had argued standing to assert that
the statute was unconstitutional on its face but that argument was denied. Id. The
trial court had granted him standing for a facial attack and found that the statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. He also sought standing based on the exception
for third parties not able to protect their interests and that for protecting first amend-
ment rights. Id. at 112-13. The court found that its decision would not affect the
rights of others because the holding was restricted to the facts of the case. Id. at 113.
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mischaracterized his conduct as private.' 17 The court found that his
conduct was public because Gray had "picked up" his sexual partner
in a public park, had an undetermined number of "one night stands"
with him, and had compensated him for their sexual encounter."l 8
The court restricted its holding to a decision that commercial sex is not
protected by the Minnesota Constitution's right to privacy."t 9 It also
found that Gray had participated in public sexual behavior and there-
fore could not properly raise the issue of whether private sexual con-
duct is protected.120 In other words, his argument that the sodomy
statute, as applied to him, violated his right to privacy in conducting
his private sexual life was inapposite.121 Because the court stated
that others would not be affected by its decision in Gray, those who
participate in private consensual sodomy are not foreclosed from as-
serting their privacy rights in the future.122 Thus, Gray was denied
standing to proceed with a facial challenge to the statute. 123 The
question of whether the state constitutional right to privacy protects
consensual adult sexual behavior conducted in private was not prop-
erly before the court.
Based on a comparison between the Minnesota Bill of Rights and
the United States Constitution, the court held that a right of privacy
similar in nature to that which exists under the United States Consti-
tution also exists under the Minnesota Constitution.124 As to the
contours of the privacy right, the court commented: "Whether the
117. Id. at 113. The court also found that, although Gray was not charged with
prostitution, the facts would support such a charge. Id. at 113-14.
118. Id. Compare United States v. Lemons, 697 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1983). In Lem-
ons, the defendant was charged with sodomy after being found engaged in a
sodomous act in a park restroom in Arkansas. Id. at 833. As in Gray, the defendant
challenged the statute on privacy grounds and the court also restricted standing to
challenge the statute as it applied to him. Id. at 834. The court then found that the
constitution did not protect public sexual acts. Id. at 836. In his dissent, Senior Cir-
cuit Judge Henley argued that "[c]onstruing appellant's offense as 'public oral sexual
activity' in order to uphold the constitutionality of the statute distorts the purpose of
the sodomy statute and distorts the nature of the case." Id. at 841. It was the sod-
omy statute which was being challenged as unconstitutional, not the statute prohibit-
ing public sexual acts. Id. FurtherJudge Henley reasoned, if the majority found that
the defendant was not convicted of homosexual sex, but of public sex, then he was
prosecuted under the wrong statute and might also argue that there had been a viola-
tion of his due process rights. Id. at 841 n.5. Like the majority in Lemons, the court in
Gray analyzed the privacy right argument as if the challenged statute was the public
lewdness or prostitution statute, neither of which Gray had challenged nor been
prosecuted under. 413 N.W.2d at 113-14.
119. 413 N.W.2d at 113.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 111.
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scope of any privacy right asserted under the Minnesota Constitution
should be expanded beyond federal holdings remains to be resolved
in future cases wherein the issue is properly raised."1 25 It remains to
be seen whether a familial context approach will be imported from
federal constitutional law to define the scope of Minnesota's privacy
right or whether an individual autonomy basis will be adopted.
Other Minnesota privacy cases may prove instructive on this
question.126
The Gray court stated that having recognized a right to privacy in
the Minnesota Constitution, it "must articulate the scope of protec-
tion afforded by that right."' 27 As a first step, the court noted that
the right of privacy protects only fundamental rights. This step is
consistent with federal constitutional analysis.128 However, two
points made in Gray could provide the basis for developing the scope
of privacy rights under Minnesota constitutional law beyond the fed-
eral limit of marriage, family and procreation.
First, the Minnesota Supreme Court chose to use a different defini-
tion of "fundamental right" than that used in Hardwick.129 Rather
than being rooted in tradition or inherent in the concept of ordered
liberty, the Gray court defined a fundamental right as one which has
an origin in the express or implicit terms of the constitution.130
125. Id. at 114.
126. Other Minnesota privacy right cases include: Voss v. Duerscherl, 425 N.W.2d
828 (Minn. 1988) (mandatory bloodtest); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn.
1988) (nonconsensual treatment with neuroleptic medication); In re Dengler, 287
N.W.2d 637 (Minn. 1979), app. dismissed sub nom., Dengler v. Attorney Gen. of Minne-
sota, 446 U.S. 949 (1980) (choice of name); Minnesota ex rel. Kremin v. Graham, 318
N.W.2d 853 (Minn. 1982) (mandatory bloodtest); State v. Vernon 283 N.W.2d 516
(Minn. 1979), app. dismissed sub nom., Carlson v. Minnesota, 444 U.S. 1062 (1979);
(cocaine possession); Minnesota State Bd. of Health v. City of Brainerd, 308 Minn.
24, 241 N.W.2d 624 (1976), reh'g denied, (March 26, 1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S.
803 (1976) (fluoridation of public water source); Price v. Shepard, 307 Minn. 250,
239 N.W.2d 905 (1976) (nonconsensual electroshock treatment).
127. State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1987).
128. "In this respect, we agree with the United States Supreme Court that the
right of privacy protects only fundamental rights." Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (1973)).
129. See 478 U.S. at 191-92. The Hardwick Court relied on the definition in Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (fundamental liberties are "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed.") and the definition in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977) (fundamental liberties are those which are "deeply rooted in this nation's
history and tradition.").
130. 413 N.W.2d at 111 (citing BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 607 (5th ed. 1979)).
Although the United States Supreme Court did not use this definition in Hardwick,
they have used a similar definition in other cases. See, e.g., Griswold v Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penum-
bras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance.").
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Considering the outcome of Hardwick, where the history of the
criminalization of sodomy was equated with the history of sodomy as
a behavior, the definition used by the Minnesota Supreme Court may
be more expansive.131 Applying the Hardwick analysis to consensual
sexual behavior, a long history of public condemnation, despite pri-
vate indulgence, could also be found. Ironically, this inconsistency
between public rules and private behavior may reflect the depth of
the public's view of consensual sex as a private matter, rather than a
reflection of the public's condemnation of sexual behavior.132
Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that it would
not be confined by the express terms of the state constitution in deter-
mining whether a right sought to be protected is a fundamental
right.l 33 Thus, the Gray definition might be more expansive in that
textual support for a privacy right concerning private consensual
sexual behavior can be found.l34 For example, the freedom of inti-
mate association and the freedom of expressive association can be
interpreted to include private sexual intimacy.I35 Moreover, the
Gray court quoted extensively from an earlier case detailing the cen-
trality of inherent and inalienable rights, the right of personal liberty
and the right to the pursuit of happiness.' 3 6 Minnesota Constitu-
tional provisions are also a part of the quotation. As the Gray court
noted, article 1, section 16 "significantly provides: 'The enumeration
of rights in this constitution shall not be construed to deny or impair
131. Perhaps the Minnesota Supreme Court had this in mind when, before ex-
plaining its definition of "fundamental rights," it stated that it is axiomatic that state
supreme courts are free to interpret their constitutions as offering greater protection
of individual rights than does the United States Constitution. 413 N.W.2d at I11.
132. Sexual behavior may be the most intimate aspect of an individual's life. 478
U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. 413 N.W.2d at 111-12.
134. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 200-06 (dissenting opinion finds textual and case
support for protecting private consensual behavior).
135. See Karst, supra note 62, at 637. This argument was raised by Gray but the
court declined to consider it because Gray was denied standing to litigate the issue of
protecting private consensual sexual behavior. 413 N.W.2d at 113.
136. 413 N.W.2d at 111-12 (quoting Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn.
218, 224-25, 14 N.W.2d 400, 405 (1944)). The right to the pursuit of happiness
sequred by the Constitution supported the Stanley decision in which the right to pri-
vacy extended to viewing pornography at home and is cited in Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Hardwick:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiri-
tual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of
the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emo-
tions and their sensations.
478 U.S. at 207 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969) (quoting
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
1989]
21
Nelson: Future Scope of Minnesota's Right to Privacy
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
others retained by and inherent in the people.' "137 Thus, language
in Gray can be used to support the retention of individual autonomy
as the basis for privacy protection.138
Second, the Minnesota Supreme Court emphasized that it is not
limited by federal decisions regarding the scope of privacy protec-
tion. 19 As the court has announced in the past, the Minnesota Con-
stitution can extend more protection to its citizens than the federal
Constitution currently provides. The Gray court also stated that it is
their responsibility to do so: "[s]tate courts are, and should be, the
first line of defense for individual liberties within the federalist sys-
tem."140 While not expanding the scope of protection beyond that
afforded by the federal Constitution, the court nonetheless stated
that it will not be limited by federal holdings should future cases
present the proper context for expanding the scope of Minnesota
Constitutional privacy protection.141 In other words, the familial
context approach set forth in Hardwick, may not operate to limit the
scope of the privacy right extended to Minnesota citizens. The ques-
tion remains, whether the language used by the Minnesota Supreme
Court describing individual liberty as seminal to the right of privacy
accurately indicates the scope of protection which the Minnesota
right to privacy extends.14 2
137. 413 N.W.2d 112. Similarly, Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Hardwick
found a basis in the ninth amendment for affirming the court of appeals' judgment
that the Georgia sodomy statute was unconstitutional. 478 U.S. at 201-02.
138. However, the opposite development can also be supported by Gray. For ex-
ample, the court concludes its opinion: "We emphasize that nothing in the court's
opinion, either expressly or impliedly, expands the individual's right of privacy under
the Minnesota Constitution beyond the parameters established for that right by the
United States Supreme Court under our Federal Constitution." Id. at 114. Those
parameters are set out at the beginning of the Gray opinion and are those wherein the
activity protected concerns only family, marriage and procreation. Id. at 110.
Interestingly, after emphasizing that they were not expanding an individual's
right to privacy under the Minnesota Constitution, the court concludes by stating
that it remains to be resolved whether the scope of Minnesota's privacy right should
be expanded. Id. at 114. However, a previous case not mentioned in Gray and per-
haps deliberately omitted, stated that at the core of privacy rights is personal auton-
omy. Price v. Shepard, 307 Minn. 250, 257, 239 N.W.2d 905, 910 (1976). Another
case, decided in 1976, cited Price in asserting that at the core of the privacy right is
the concept of personal autonomy. Minnesota State Bd. of Health v. City of Brai-
nerd, 308 Minn. 24, 35, 241 N.W.2d 624, 631 (1976). However, City of Brainerd may
help sever Price from development of the scope of Minnesota privacy rights. See infra
notes 173-83 and accompanying text.
139. 413 N.W.2d at 111.
140. Id. (quoting State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726-27 (Minn. 1985)).
141. Id. at 114.
142. Price has subsequently been used to reiterate that the concept of personal
autonomy is basic to the right of privacy. See Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148
(Minn. 1988). However, theJarvis court uses this concept within the context of non-
consensual medical treatment. Id. at 145. BecauseJarvis emphasized nonconsensual
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V. MINNESOTA RIGHT-TO-PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In Gray, the court adopted an approach for analyzing privacy cases
arising under the Minnesota Constitution.t43 However, once the
court found that Gray's conduct occurred within a commercial sexual
relationship and therefore did not concern a fundamental right, the
analysis was cut short. 144 The approach used in Price v. Shepard 145
should predict the steps the court will follow in analyzing future con-
stitutional challenges based on an infringement of the Minnesota
right to privacy. 146
After finding that an activity regulated by the challenged statute
involves a fundamental right, the court must decide whether the stat-
ute impermissibly interferes with the exercise of that right. 147 In dis-
cussing the limits of the privacy right, the Price court stated, "[l]ike
other constitutional rights, . . . this right is not an absolute
one.. . ."148 Indeed, the individual's privacy right is subordinate to
appropriate interests of the state. However, in order for state inter-
ference to be constitutional, the state's objective must be appropri-
ate and the means chosen to attain it must be necessary and
reasonable.t49 Although often thought of as a two-pronged test,
medical treatment instead of decisional privacy when it applied Price, the court may
restrict its expansive language in Price from the development of the scope of privacy
protection based upon its factual context of intrusive nonconsensual medical treat-
ment and its unique position as a standard for procedural due process. See infra note
166 and accompanying text.
143. 413 N.W.2d at 112.
144. Id. at 113-14.
145. 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976).
146. However, at the outset the court noted that "it is far too early in the evolu-
tion of the right of privacy to offer any single definition or rule of what the right
entails." Id. at 256, 239 N.W.2d at 910. The court stated that the importance of the
emerging right is such as to warrant an analysis despite a conclusion of whether or
not a privacy right is implicated in the case. Id. at 255-56, 239 N.W.2d at 910. The
court then set forth its summary of the analysis to follow in privacy cases according to
its understanding to date. Id. at 257-58, 239 N.W.2d at 910-11. While the court
may have been referring to its understanding of the privacy right of federal jurispru-
dence, it left room to allow the analysis of Minnesota privacy cases to evolve.
In Jarvis v. Levine, twelve years after Price, the court rejected an argument that
Price was decided solely under the federal Constitution. 418 N.W.2d at 147. The
court then cited Gray for the proposition that the privacy right exists in the Minnesota
Constitution, stating: "Protection of the state right of privacy would require the same
procedures we established in Price." Id. at 148. (emphasis added). The "procedures"
referred to are the judicial review procedures used to determine the necessity and
reasonableness of intrusive nonconsensual medical treatment before the treatment
may be administered. Id.
147. Price, 307 Minn. at 258, 239 N.W.2d at 911.
148. Id. at 257, 239 N.W.2d at 910.
149. Id. at 257-58, 239 N.W.2d at 910-11. In order to justify its intrusion the
state must first show a legitimate and important state interest. The sufficiency of that
interest depends upon the impact on the individual. Id.
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three steps can be identified. First, as illustrated in Onofre, the state's
objective must be a legitimate goal for which the police power is in-
voked.150 In other words, the legislative objective must be to protect
public health, safety or welfare.151 If the challenged statute does not
serve any of the legitimate uses of the police power, it is unnecessary
to determine what level of state interest justifies an intrusion upon
the fundamental right sought to be protected.15 2 In Onofre, the sod-
omy statute was found to be motivated by objectives inappropriate
for the use of the police power.1 5 3 Scrutiny of this threshold step is
crucial in the area of prescribing private morality by legislation seek-
ing to promote public morality.
Second, if the statute is a legitimate use of police power, the na-
ture of the state's interest in meeting its objective must be deter-
mined.154 In Price, the court stated that whether that interest must
be legitimate, important, or compelling depends upon the "impact
of the decision on the life of the individual."'55 If the impact on the
individual is of major consequence, the state's interest in regulating
that behavior must be a compelling one in order to justify its intru-
sion.156 Should Price remain a standard for decisional privacy cases,
this step will prove to be the most important to the outcome of a
constitutional challenge.157
To be entitled to constitutional protection, the interest of an indi-
vidual in being free from interference in making decisions regarding
a nonharmful, private behavior must demonstrably outweigh the in-
terest of the state in influencing that decision.158 Persuasive author-
ity on the weight of an individual's interest would be similar to that
needed to demonstrate the state's impact on his or her life.159
Finally, even if the state interest is sufficient to justify intrusion on
an individual's right to privacy, the means used to serve that interest
150. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 488-90, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951-52, 415 N.E.2d 936, 941-42
(1980).
151. See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1142-43 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Peo-
ple v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 489, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951, 415 N.E.2d 936, 941
(1980).
152. See Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 490, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952, 415 N.E.2d at 941-42.
153. Id. at 490, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952, 415 N.E.2d at 941.
154. 307 Minn. at 258, 239 N.W.2d at 911.
155. Id. at 257, 239 N.W.2d at 910.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1130 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769
F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). The district court in Baker
weighed the authority and expert testimony about intrusiveness heavily enough to
include it extensively in its opinion.
158. Id.
159. See supra note 65.
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must be both necessary and reasonable.160 In analyzing necessity
and reasonableness, the Price court explained that when there are
other means of achieving a permitted state objective, the means cho-
sen must represent the least intrusive method available.161 Thus, in
the context of private consensual sexual behavior, the existence of
other statutes which prohibit public lewd behavior, prostitution,
forced sexual conduct and adult corruption of minors indicates that
the sodomy statute is not necessary to protect public health, safety
and welfare.162 However, the level of deference given to the state's
choice of means remains to be seen.
In Price, the court concluded that electroshock therapy was one of
the most intrusive forms of medical treatment. 63 Consequently, the
impact of the state's action in Price was of such magnitude as to re-
quire a state interest "sufficiently important" to justify its infringe-
ment on the patient's privacy rights.164 However, because the state
was immune from liability, the court refused to decide whether the
treatment was necessary and reasonable.165 Little indication exists
on how firm the court will be in its demand for a showing that the
means of effectuating an appropriate state interest are necessary and
reasonable, and thus, a permissible infringement of an individual's
right to privacy.166
In sum, previous Minnesota privacy cases indicate that the above
four steps will be used to analyze future challenges to a statute on
160. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 144 (Minn. 1988); Price v. Sheppard, 307
Minn. 250, 262, 239 N.W.2d 905, 913 (1976).
161. Price, 307 Minn. at 260-62, 239 N.W.2d 911-13.
162. Furthermore, because of the existence of more narrowly drawn criminal sex-
ual conduct statutes, the sodomy statute as it is enforced is not necessary to meet the
legislative goal. See also United States v. Lemons, 697 F.2d 832, 841 (8th Cir. 1983)
(Henley, J., dissenting).
163. 307 Minn. at 260, 239 N.W.2d at 912.
164. Id. at 259, 239 N.W.2d at 911. The court does not state what level of interest
the state has, however, the state's interest was sufficient to deprive the patient of
liberty when it committed the patient. Therefore, the interest in treatment must have
been sufficiently important. Id. at 259, 239 N.W.2d at 911.
165. Id. at 260, 239 N.W.2d at 912. The court reasoned that the state could not
have known it was acting unconstitutionally because of the vagueness of the constitu-
tional right to privacy. Id. at 261, 239 N.W.2d at 912.
166. By simply stating that it did not reach the question of whether the elec-
troshock treatments were necessary and reasonable the court provided almost no
guidance for determining how to answer this question. Id. at 260, 239 N.W.2d at
912. The court did, however, set forth judicial review procedures to be followed in
future cases to determine the necessity and reasonableness of the prescribed treat-
ment before the state may impose "intrusive" forms of treatment on non-consenting
patients. Id. at 262-63, 239 N.W.2d at 913. See alsoJarvis, 418 N.W.2d at 144-48
(holding that the Price procedures for determining necessity and reasonableness must
be followed before the state can administer neuroleptic drugs to an involuntarily
committed mental patient without the patient's consent).
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the grounds that it impermissibly interferes with an individual's right
to decisional privacy as it is protected by the Minnesota Constitu-
tion. 167 The analysis is effective to determine the extent of privacy
protection without resort to a restriction of the scope of privacy to a
familial context.
VI. FUTURE SCOPE OF MINNESOTA RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The Price case involved a challenge to the nonconsensual adminis-
tration of electroshock therapy as an infringement of decisional pri-
vacy by a state actor.' 68 In Price, the Minnesota Supreme Court
stated, "[a]t the core of the privacy decisions, in our judgment, is the
concept of personal autonomy-the notion that the Constitution
reserves to the individual, free of governmental intrusion, certain
fundamental decisions about how he or she will conduct his or her
life."169 Sexual decisions can be considered fundamental decisions
regarding the conduct of one's life in its most intimate aspect.' 70
Further, the importance of sexuality to development and definition
of self has become better understood and is considered fundamental
to the development of human personality.171
As the right to privacy is debated by theorists, different categories
of privacy rights are being distinguished. The right to privacy en-
compasses spatial privacy and informational privacy. 172 The right to
bodily integrity, a right recognized in common law, is considered a
privacy right.'7s Because of the categorization of privacy rights and
the recent familial context used by the United States Supreme Court
to analyze decisional privacy, a theoretical categorization could fol-
low by which the personal autonomy basis for privacy rights an-
nounced in earlier Minnesota cases is lost to decisional privacy right
167. E.g., Minnesota ex rel. Kremin v. Graham, 318 N.W.2d 853, 855 n.5 (Minn.
1982); Voss v. Duerscherl, 408 N.W.2d 161, 166-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd on
other grounds, 425 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 1988).
168. 307 Minn. at 253, 239 N.W.2d at 908.
169. Id. at 257, 239 N.W.2d at 910.
170. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult
Theatres I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973). "Only the most willful blindness could
obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is 'a sensitive, key relationship of human exist-
ence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human per-
sonality.'. . . It is precisely because the issue raised by this case [Hardwick] touches the
heart of what makes individuals what they are that we should be especially sensitive to the
rights of those whose choices upset the majority." Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 205. See generally sources cited supra note 80.
172. Id. at 203-04.
173. Minnesota State Bd. of Health v. City of Brainerd, 308 Minn. 24, 36, 241
N.W.2d 624, 631 (1976). "No right is held more sacred or is more carefully guarded,
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person . I. " d. (quoting Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891)).
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cases. 17 4
It is unclear how the precedent of Minnesota privacy cases will be
used to define the scope of privacy guaranteed by the state constitu-
tion. Minnesota precedent should broaden the scope of protection
from that afforded by the federal Constitution.175 Conversely, cate-
gorization of earlier privacy cases according to the behavior involved
could justify restricting the scope of Minnesota privacy protection
despite the spirit of Minnesota precedent. Like the language in ear-
lier United States Supreme Court decisions which indicated that the
right to decisional privacy was protected in order to protect individ-
ual autonomy and dignity, the language in Minnesota cases which
provides precedent for defining the scope of decisional privacy on a
personal autonomy basis could be similarly deceptive.
The court analyzed the constitutional challenge in Price as one
based on decisional privacy. 17 6 However, the court could distinguish
Price as involving bodily integrity because it concerned nonconsen-
sual medical treatment. 17 7 In a later paternity suit, Minnesota ex reL
Kremin v. Graham,178 the court addressed the right to privacy chal-
lenge as a challenge based on the right to bodily integrity. 179 The
court's reason for not using Price when deciding Graham, rather than
indicating that Price will not be restricted to categorization as a "bod-
ily integrity" case, could be due to the fact that Price established
standards for procedural due process which must be followed before
174. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
175. The court in Price was careful to remark that the privacy right analysis was a
newly emerging federal doctrine not yet clearly understood. 307 Minn. at 256, 239
N.W.2d at 910. Thus, the court has a choice between building on the analysis it
developed in Price-individual autonomy as the "core" of privacy, or discounting it
because Price was a decision too early in the development of federal doctrine which
has subsequently been clarified by Hardwick as a right restricted to a familial context.
176. 307 Minn. at 258, 239 N.W.2d at 911. The court set forth its understanding
of the federal privacy right as an "independent constitutional" right, denominated as
such by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 307 Minn. at 256, 239
N.W.2d at 910. "[T]he notion [is] that the Constitution reserves to the individual...
certain fundamental decisions about how he or she will conduct his or her life." 307
Minn. at 257, 239 N.W.2d at 910. The Price court further demonstrated its reliance
on the concept of decisional privacy by stating: "The question in the case before us is
whether the state, consistent with Dwight Price's right of privacy, can assume the
decision of whether Dwight, an involuntarily committed mental patient, will undergo
psychiatric treatment." Id. at 258, 239 N.W.2d at 911.
177. Because Price concerned an application of electroshock therapy, perhaps the
lack of physical ingestion kept the court from using the bodily integrity language
used in City of Brainerd and subsequent blood test cases. The expansive language of
Price in which personal autonomy is said to be at the core of privacy rights could be
restricted to bodily integrity cases. City of Brainerd, 308 Minn. at 35-36, 241 N.W.2d
at 631 (quoting Price).
178. 318 N.W.2d 853 (Minn. 1982).
179. Graham, 318 N.W.2d at 855-56.
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nonconsensual medical treatment may be administered by the
state. 180
InJarvis v. Levine, 18 1 a 1988 privacy case with facts nearly identical
to those in Price, the court held that the procedures established in
Price apply to nonconsensual treatment with neuroleptic drugs. 18 2
Rather than discussing the right to decisional privacy,Jarvis restated
the privacy right involved in Price as the right to refuse medical treat-
ment.183 Noting that the right to privacy exists under the Minnesota
constitution as announced in Gray, the Jarvis court explained that
"[t]he right begins with protecting the integrity of one's own body
and includes the right not to have it altered or invaded without con-
sent."184 The court further explained that although the constitu-
tional right of privacy in Minnesota is relatively recent, the
protection of bodily integrity is firmly rooted in common law.185
Hopefully, Minnesota courts will not categorize Price and Jarvis as
privacy cases involving the right to bodily integrity or the right to
refuse medical treatment. As theJarvis court described, denying an
individual the right to refuse medical treatment deprives him or her
of basic human dignity by denying an individual his or her personal
autonomy.18 6 The court emphasized that "the final decision to ac-
cept or reject a proposed medical treatment and its attendant risks is
ultimately not a medical decision, but a personal choice."187
Clearly, Minnesota precedent indicates that decisional privacy pro-
tection is based on the protection of human dignity and individual
autonomy. However, the lesson of Hardwick is to avoid that assump-
tion. Because constitutional privacy protection extends only to fun-
damental rights, and because the right to bodily integrity was
identified in early common law, characterization of Price as a bodily
integrity case could sever it from the development of the scope of
decisional privacy protection. The language in Price which supports
a personal autonomy basis for defining the scope of protection
180. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 144 (Minn. 1988).
181. 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988).
182. Id. at 148.
183. Id. at 147. Although recognizing Minnesota's right to privacy as established
in Gray the court did not analyze the scope of privacy protection but instead focused
on the procedural protection granted to involuntarily committed mental patients. Id.
at 148. Whether Price andJarvis will be used in cases beyond the context of noncon-
sensual medical treatment remains to be seen. Hopefully, the court will maintain its
understanding that personal autonomy exists at the core of privacy rights despite the
Hardwick restriction in the decisional privacy analysis, and also despite the restricted
use of Price in nonconsensual medical treatment cases.
184. Id. at 148
185. Id. at 148-49.
186. Id. at 148.
187. Id. (emphasis in the original).
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would thereby be lost.' 8 8
Beside the danger of over-categorization of privacy rights, the dan-
ger of state constitutional analysis mimicking that of federal constitu-
tional analysis remains. As eloquent as the analysis in Price is, if the
court adopts a familial context approach to protecting individuals
from undue governmental interference in personal decisions, consti-
tutional protection would result only when the decision sought to be
protected is one concerning family, marriage or procreation. The
use of a familial context to define the scope of decisional privacy ig-
nores the original notion that it is fundamental rights which are pro-
tected within the scope of decisional privacy.' 89 Once the decision
sought to be protected is identified as one falling outside the context
of family, marriage and procreation there is no need to determine
whether the decision otherwise concerns a fundamental right. Fam-
ily, marriage, and procreation thus become the limit, and the defini-
tion, of fundamental rights for decisional privacy analysis. Any other
arena of behavior remains unprotected. A personal autonomy ap-
proach to privacy protection would return the focus to whether the
decision sought to be protected is a decision which implicates the
exercise of a fundamental right.
When applied to consensual sexual choices, the difference in the
theoretic basis for decisional privacy is easily seen as outcome deter-
minative. Although essential to procreation, sexuality is not procrea-
tion. Although essential to the creation of the traditional model of
family, sexuality is not family. Although existing within the marriage
union, sexuality is beyond marriage. Limiting decisions protected to
those regarding procreation, family, and marriage led the Hardwick
Court to state that "the proposition that any kind of private sexual
conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from
State proscription is insupportable."190
An individual autonomy basis for granting decisional privacy
should protect decisions regarding private consensual sexual con-
188. Only fundamental rights are protected within the right to privacy under the
Minnesota Constitution and the federal Constitution. 413 N.W.2d at 111. However,
fundamental rights are to be discerned in federal privacy cases according to whether
the behavior sought to be protected is deeply rooted in tradition or inherent in the
concept of ordered liberty. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986). Be-
cause the United States Supreme Court has stated it must be a decision regarding
behaviors related to family, marriage or procreation, it is hard to distinguish between
a fundamental right analysis and a determination of whether the behavior is within
the scope of privacy protection. One hopes that the restrictive scope of federal pri-
vacy protection will not become a shorthand way of deciding whether a fundamental
right is being asserted.
189. SeeJarvis, 418 N.W.2d at 148.
190. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191. Cf State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Minn.
1987).
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duct because of the fundamental right to be left alone in spheres of
decision making which are crucial to an individual's life. Beside rec-
ognition of the nature of sexual intimacy as being fundamental to the
life of an individual, constitutional text can be interpreted to protect
sexual intimacy as expressive association,191 as conduct removed
from inquiry under the privacy of home,192 as an integral part of the
pursuit of happiness, 193 and as prohibited establishment of
religion. 194
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, sexual intimacy represents decision making
regarding the possession and control of one's own body; therefore,
sexual intimacy is a part of one's bodily integrity. However, private
consensual sexual conduct is not the focus of this Comment. As a
sphere of decisionmaking which is intensely personal and one un-
comfortable to some readers, it provides merely one concrete exam-
ple of the importance of the theoretic base which is used in defining
the scope of the constitutional right to privacy. The complex inter-
action of religion, law, and unexplored assumptions which dictate
the opinions formed about the nature of the behavior in question
will be the common denominator between Gray and future Minne-
sota decisional privacy cases involving other types of behavior.
As defined by the Hardwick court, the right of privacy is restricted
to a trio of legally recognized fundamental rights of choice-those
choices regarding procreation, family, and marriage. Minnesota
courts need not follow the Hardwick approach. The type of choice
being made should dictate not whether it is a protected choice, but
to what extent the choice is protected from governmental interfer-
ence. Rather than determining where the line between the state's
interest and the individual's interest is drawn, the type of decision
being made should determine whether the state's interest must be
rational, important, or compelling in order to justify its interference
with the individual's choice.
Moreover, limiting the scope of privacy rights based on the familial
context of the decision, results in protection being granted only to
those individuals who need to make choices regarding marriage,
family, and procreation. Instead of protecting individual autonomy
191. See, e.g., Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 202 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Karst, supra note 62, at 637.
192. See e.g., Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); Paris Adult The-
atre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
193. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
194. Cf Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 211 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (origin of anti-
sodomy statutes is patently theological and therefore enacting these statutes could be
construed as establishment of religion).
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from governmental intrusion, it is an individual's familial status
which is protected. Although the sanctity of the family is a tradi-
tional value in our society, no less is the sanctity of individual liberty.
Should Minnesota adopt individual autonomy as the primary reason
for protecting an individual's decision about how to conduct his or
her life free from governmental intrusion, more than family status
would be protected. The Minnesota Constitution should be inter-
preted to protect the individual in a more generous fashion than that
resulting from the familial context adopted by the United States
Supreme Court.
Granted, an autonomy based privacy right is more difficult to ap-
ply. It calls for the use of complex analytical skills by jurists and law-
yers, and provokes greater controversy over the decision made.
Choosing the familial context approach of defining the universe of
decisions entitled to constitutional protection avoids the hard work
to be done in a society forced to make choices never anticipated.
Current religion and law may inform an individual's decision making
but provide lessening guidance on the use of increasingly complex
medico-technological capabilities.
Perhaps more importantly, increasing understanding of human in-
terdependence demands increasing the public interest with which
private decisions are made. Privacy questions regarding drug testing
in the work place, waste and pollution generation, and conservation
of energy resources are unanswerable under the family context ap-
proach. The list of private decisions which affect public problems is
growing. Any of them may end in a courtroom and present a chal-
lenge to the authority of a government to interfere with that choice.
Basing the right to decisional privacy on the familial context within
which the choice is made creates an analysis which proves useless to
deciding the privacy cases to come. The notion that personal auton-
omy is the basis for privacy protection as enunciated in Price should
be retained for future cases involving decisional privacy.
N. Nelson
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